会计稳健性的第一篇：解释和意义

　内容提要：本文是会计稳健性两篇文章中的第一篇。第一篇对稳健性进行了解释以及探讨了稳健性对会计监督的影响。第二篇总结了稳健性的实验证据及对稳健性的解释，并提出未来研究方向。文章证明了稳健性的存在，对不同程度下的稳健性进行了不同的解释。

　会计稳健性的定义是指要求对收益与损失的不对称确认，其极端形式下传统的稳健性定义为“不预期收益，但预期所有的损失”。尽管有人指责会计稳健性，但是稳健性已经存在了几个世纪，并在近30年中有所加强。

　支持稳健性的一种理论解释是：契约理论、股东诉讼理论、税收理论和会计管制理论。在文章的第二篇中用证据表明契约和股东诉讼是最重要的因素，证据表明税收和会计管制相对比较弱，盈余管理也可能产生稳健性，但这不能成为主要的因素。

　对稳健性的解释和证明对会计管理机制有着重要的影响。财务会计委员会曾试图禁止会计稳健性，以实现“信息中立”而忽略稳健性长期存在的原因，这种意图可能会失败并产生意想不到的后果。消除会计稳健性将会改变会计管理行为，并且会增大经济上的费用。同样的，研究人员和监管机构考虑把未来现金流量列入财务报表，其产生的成本会对会计管理行为存在影响。

　本文是会计稳健性性研究的第一篇，研究的目的主要是：

　1、对会计稳健性的解释

　2、对财务法规和准则的设置

　文章的第二篇的研究目的是：

　 1、总结稳健性存在的证据

　 2、对证据进行评估去辨别不同稳健性的解释

　 3、对证据进行评估去辨别稳健性与非稳健性

　对会计稳健性解释的讨论是大多是基于利用现有的文献。然而，本文是立足于契约观，包括了债务合同的约束的解释(Watts 1993),以及与其使用的其他合同，如管理薪酬契约也会产生影响。本文也提供了新的论点，即使不考虑契约，一旦信息成本变化后管理层的行为也会产生会计稳健性的现象进行了介绍。

　稳健性的定义

　传统的稳健性定义是“不预期收益，但预期所有的损失”(Bliss 1924)。预期收益是指所承认的收益是通过法律允许的，是可以被证实前的收益。稳健性原则并不意味着所有的收入现金流应该在收入确认前收到——赊账销售是被认可的——但那些现金流应该是可以被证实的。在实证文献中稳健性的概念被解释为“相比确认坏消息而言，会计人员倾向于寻找更多证据支持好消息的确认。”(Basu 1997,7)稳健性是对收益和损失的不对称确认。这种解释下收益与损失确认差异越大，稳健性程度也就越大，本文采用的就是这种“差异化验证”解释的稳健性。

　稳健性的一个重要结果就是不对称地处理收益与损失，其后果是持续低估净资产值。有些资本市场监管机构、准则制定者以及学者批评稳健性，因为当前的低估收益会导致未来收入的夸大。例如会计研究公报(ARB)21美国注册会计师协会1939年规定：稳健性在资产负债表中如果不确定性影响到了利润表，这就是很重要的。

　稳健性主义来描述利润表对某一特定时期的影响，这并不符合稳健性的定义。稳健性是自公司营运开始在资产负债表的累计收入或盈利。

　会计核算中稳健性的影响既长远又有意义。Basu(1997,8)认为稳健性的影响至少有500年了。最近的实证研究表明在过去的30年会计核算变得越来越稳健。鉴于许多资本市场的监管机制、准则制定方和学者对稳健性的口诛笔伐，结果是令人吃惊的，稳健性长期存在却又遭受很多的批评1 例如监管机构、准则制定方、学院方的观点见Levitt (1998), FASB (1980, paras. 91-97), 和 Devine (1963, 127)。

　1 例如监管机构、准则制定方、学院方的观点见Levitt (1998), FASB (1980, paras. 91-97), 和 Devine (1963, 127)。

　稳健性原则的解释与概述

　研究人员提出很多对稳健性报告的解释，所有的题提议都是稳健性原则应是使用户收益的公司会计报表。有一种解释是稳健性的产生是因为它的一部分是有效的技术应用于组织公司和与各方签订的合同契约。在这种契约观的解释下，稳健性意味着是一种道德风险，是化解契约中由于各方报酬不对称而带来的道德风险的一种手段。例如，稳健性可以包含管理层的机会主义行为的合同用于会计核算。

　即使把契约和管理会计行为从会计报告中分离，道德风险问题仍将存在与财务报告中，只要会计管理绩效措施告知投资者便会影响资产配置者的投资决策和管理层的福利。管理层因此会倾向于使用有偏见的计量方法，稳健性可以抑制机会主义行为，抵消公司管理层的乐观偏见形成非对称的管理偏见。

　在实践中，稳健性大大的抵消了更多的管理层偏见，而且延迟了收入和低估累计收益及近资产。这些影响在契约中会增加公司的价值，因为它们限制了管理层中的机会主义向自己以及其他各方的支付，例如股东。增加的公司价值是双方共享的，能提高双方的福利，在这个意义上说，稳健性是一种有效的契约机制。

　稳健性很可能是一个高效的在契约情况下的财务报告机制。下文讨论的其他稳健性的解释，除了稳健性是抵消管理层的偏见，非缔约双方也是能约束管理层和缔约方的机会付款。鉴于此，稳健性和它所产生的净资产偏差也可能是必要的有效的财务报表的组成部分，是“好”而不是“坏”的。信息观点的支持者没有看到稳健性的好处，因为他们对信息不对称所造成的结果和影响以及对信息投资者成本与效益的分析具有局限性。

　信息观点的支持者没有看到稳健性的好处，因为他们对信息不对称所造成的结果和影响以及对信息投资者成本与效益的分析具有局限性。

　股东诉讼是稳健性的另一个来源。管理层在高估利润和资产的时候更容易面临诉讼风险。通过资产的低估可以降低预计的诉讼费用。通过诉讼成本的不对称来限制投机性支付的风险，从这一程度的解释表明，个人当事人以外的公司也是这样约束的，用稳健性来降低诉讼风险。

　税收也是稳健性产生的原因之一。对立的和损失进行不对称的确认能使企业减少税收的现值，从而提升公司的价值，推迟收入确认加快支出确认从而推迟纳税。

　最后，财务报告准则的制定机构和监管机构也在财务报告中有运用稳健性的动机。正如类似一个不对称的诉讼成本，准则制定机构对会计实务的规范成本也是不对称的。在会计信息被高估时监管方将面临更多的指责，所以稳健的会计信息可以降低政治成本。政治成本的不对称就如不对称的诉讼成本时是一致的，非契约方谨慎的制约了管理层和其他各方的投机付款行为。

　在对稳健性进行了解释，正如我们所见稳健性原则通过契约、诉讼、税收、会计管制来约束管理层和其他各方的投机付款行为。

　最近的经验证据表明会计稳健性存在上升的趋势，以不同的程度体现在四个稳健性的解释中。然而文中的第二篇中一些证据与两种解释一致并不意味着稳健性。这些解释之一是通过盈余管理来低估资产，承担额外的费用和过度的冲销，以夸大未来收益(Hanna 2002)另一种解释是管理层选择放弃盈利(Hayn 1995)。而这些解释可以解释公司属性所产生的保守主义，如暂时的损失。它们无法共同或单独解释净资产，只是标志性地描述了稳健性原则。

　文章的第二篇用各种各样对稳健性的解释来证明稳健性在财务报告中向资本市场的投资者提供信息的建设性作用。这意味着会计监管机构和准则制定方都应反思其反对稳健性的行为。

　契约观对稳健性的解释

　对稳健性的四个解释中，笔者认为契约观是最详尽的解释，因为它是稳健性的来源以及它的论点更有发展的空间。越来越多的论点的解释都只是从信息质量的角度看问题的。此外，契约观的解释强调正式的契约，如债务契约和合同管理层的报酬，它们扩大到了包括管理会计和管理系统的公司的组织安排，即使是税收观的解释也是属于契约观的解释之中。

　会计中使用契约是非常那个古老的做法，跨越了几个世纪公司都在采用(Watts 和 Zimmerman 1983)，用来进行管理控制(De Ste Croix 1956 和Chadwick 1992)。研究者提出，这种长期过程中影响了当代会计和财务报告，导致稳健性倾向于使用偏见的计量方法(Watts and Zimmennan1986; Watts 1993; Basu1995)。

　相比之下，其它稳健性的解释是最近一段时间才出现的。股东诉讼的出现是在美国20世纪60年代，并随着其发展而成为稳健性的解释之一，税收系统影响财务报告的会计处理方法，是一种近期出现的解释，可追溯到1909年。一些谨慎的会计管制机构的财务报告，它们的历史可以回溯到1933年和1934年。

　契约的解释包含了三种属性：及时性、可核性、不对称性的可验证性。在债务、赔偿和其他契约解释中稳健性成为了一个有效的契约机制，因为它对契约的性能测试中要求使对收益的确认比损失的确认有更严格的核查标准。一如既往，由于不对称的确认导致收益的确认比损失延迟，其结果是净资产和累计收益不太可能被夸大，降低了违反契约的可能性。

　出处： Watts R L. Conservatism in accounting part Ι:explanations and implication [J]. Accounting Horizons,2003,(3):207-221.

　原文：

　Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications

　Watts R L. Accounting Horizons,2003

　SYNOPSIS: This paper is the first in a two-part series on conservatism in accounting. Part I examines alternative explanations for conservatism in accounting and their implications for accounting regulators. Part II summarizes the empirical evidence on conservatism, its consistency with alternative explanations, and opportunities for future research. The evidence is consistent with conservatism's existence and, in varying degrees, the various explanations.

　Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses." Despite criticism, conservatism has survived in accounting for many centuries and appears to have increased in the last 30 years.

　The alternative explanations for conservatism are contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. The evidence in Part II suggests the contracting and shareholder litigation explanations are most important. Evidence on the effects of taxation and regulation is weaker, but consistent with those explanations playing a role. Earnings management could produce some of the evidence on conservatism, but cannot be the prime explanation.

　The explanations and evidence have important implications for accounting regulators. FASB attempts to ban conservatism in order to achieve "neutrality of information" without understanding the reasons conservatism existed and prospered for so long are likely to fail and produce unintended consequences. Successful elimination of conservatism will change managerial behavior and impose significant costs on investors and the economy in general. Similarly, researchers and regulators who propose the inclusion of capitalized unverifiable future cash flows in financial reports should consider the costs generated by their proposal's effect on managerial behavior.

　INTRODUCTION

　This paper is Part I in a two-part series on conservatism in accounting. The objectives of this paper are to:

　1. Discuss the explanations for conservatism; and

　2. Draw implications for regulation and standard setting.

　The objectives of Part II in the series are to:

　1. Summarize the evidence on conservatism's existence;

　2. Evaluate the evidence's ability to discriminate among conservatism explanations; and

　3. Evaluate the evidence's ability to discriminate between conservatism and non-conservatism explanations.

　The explanations discussion draws on existing literature. However, this paper develops a general contracting explanation for conservatism that encompasses the existing debt contract dividend constraint explanation (Watts 1993) and predicts that other contracts employed within the firm, such as managerial compensation contracts, will also generate conservatism. The paper also offers a new argument that, even without contracting considerations, an information perspective produces conservatism once the information costs of changed managerial behavior are introduced.

　Conservatism Defined

　Accounting conservatism is traditionally defined by the adage "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses" (Bliss 1924). Anticipating profits means recognizing profits before there is legal claim to the revenues generating them and that the revenues are verifiable. Conservatism does not imply that all revenue cash flows should be received before profits are recognized—credit sales are recognized—but rather that those cash flows should be verifiable. In the empirical literature the adage is interpreted as representing "the accountant's tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses" (Basu 1997, 7). Conservatism is the asymmetrical verification requirements for gains and losses. This interpretation allows for degrees of conservatism: the greater the difference in degree of verification required for gains versus losses, the greater the conservatism. It is this "differential verification" interpretation of conservatism that is adopted in this paper.

　An important consequence of conservatism's asymmetric treatment of gains and losses is the persistent understatement of net asset values. Capital market regulators, standard setters, and academics criticize conservatism because this understatement in the current period can lead to overstatement of earnings in future periods by causing an understatement of future expenses. For example Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 2 (AICPA 1939) states:

　Conservatism in the balance sheet is of dubious value if attained at the expense of conservatism in the income statement, which is far more significant.

　Using "conservatism" to describe an income statement effect for a particular period was popularized by conservatism's critics. That usage does not fit with the conservatism definition employed here. Conservatism refers to the cumulative financial effects represented in the balance sheet and to income or earnings cumulated since the firm began operation.

　Conservatism's influence on accounting practice has been both long and significant. Basu (1997, 8) argues that conservatism has influenced accounting practice for at least 500 years. Sterling (1970, 256) rates conservatism as the most influential principle of valuation in accounting .Recent empirical research on conservatism suggests not only that accounting practice is conservative, but also that practice has become more conservative in the last 30 years. These results are surprising given the vocal opposition of many capital market regulators, standard setters, and academics to conservatism. For examples of the opposition of regulators, standard setters and academies to conservatism see Levitt (1998), FASB (1980, paras. 91-97), and Devine (1963, 127). The long survival of conservatism and its apparent resilience to criticism strongly suggests that conservatism's critics overlook its significant benefits. If regulator and standard-setter critics try to eliminate conservatism without understanding its benefits, the resultant standards are likely to be seriously detrimental to financial reporting.

　 For examples of the opposition of regulators, standard setters and academies to conservatism see Levitt (1998), FASB (1980, paras. 91-97), and Devine (1963, 127).

　Overview of Explanations for Conservatism

　Researchers advance a number of explanations for conservative reporting; all of them suggest that conservatism benefits users of the firm's accounting reports. One explanation is that conservatism arises because it is part of the efficient technology employed in the organization of the firm and its contracts with various parties. Under this contracting explanation, conservative accounting is a means of addressing moral hazard caused by parties to the firm having asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited horizons, and limited liability. For example, conservatism can contain management's opportunistic behavior in reporting accounting measures used in a contract.

　Even if one separates contracting and managerial accounting from financial reporting, moral hazard problems will exist in financial reporting as long as the reports' accounting measures inform investors about managerial performance and affect investors' asset allocation decisions and managers' welfare. These effects on managers' welfare will motivate managers to introduce bias and noise into the same accounting measures that regulators hope will inform investors, just as they motivate managers to introduce bias and noise into contractual accounting measures. Absent constraints on this opportunistic managerial behavior, accounting measures in financial reports that a priori appear neutral will be significantly biased and noisy in practice. Conservatism constrains managerial opportunistic behavior and offsets managerial biases with its asymmetrical verifiability requirement.

　In practice, conservatism more than offsets managerial bias, and on average defers earnings and understates cumulative earnings and net assets. In contracts these effects increase firm value because they constrain managements' opportunistic payments to themselves and other parties, such as shareholders. The increased firm value is shared among all parties to the firm, increasing everyone's welfare. In that sense, conservatism is an efficient contracting mechanism. Contracting explains three attributes of accounting measures: timeliness, verifiability, and asymmetric verifiability.

　Conservatism is likely to be an efficient financial reporting mechanism in the absence of contracting. Other conservatism explanations discussed below suggest that, in addition to conservatism offsetting managerial bias in financial reporting, non-contracting parties in society also value conservatism's constraint on opportunistic payments to managers and other contracting parties. Given that, conservatism and the net asset bias it generates are probably necessary components of efficient financial reporting that are "good" and not "bad" as implied by various statements by accounting regulators and academics.

　 The information perspective's proponents fail to recognize conservatism's benefits because of their limited analysis of the effects of asymmetric payoffs and limited liability on the costs and benefits of information to investors.

　Shareholder litigation is another source of conservatism in recent years. Litigation also produces asymmetric payoffs in that overstating the firm's net assets is more likely to generate litigation costs for the firm than understating net assets. By understating net assets, conservatism reduces the firm's expected litigation costs. The asymmetry in litigation costs is consistent with the legal system evolving to constrain opportunistic payments to managers and other parties to the firm. To that extent, the litigation explanation suggests that individuals other than the parties to the firm also value such constraint.

　The links between taxation and reporting can also generate conservatism in financial reporting. Asymmetric recognition of gains and losses enables managers of profitable firms to reduce the present value of taxes and increase the value of the firm. Delaying the recognition of revenues and accelerating the recognition of expense defers tax payments.

　Finally, financial reporting standard setters and regulators have their own incentives to favor conservative accounting and reporting. Just as there is an asymmetry in litigation costs, there is an asymmetry in regulators' costs. Standard setters and regulators are likely to face more criticism if firms overstate net assets than if they understate net assets. Conservatism reduces the political costs imposed on standard setters and regulators. This asymmetry in political costs, like the asymmetry in litigation costs, is consistent with non-contracting parties (such as voters) valuing conservatism's constraint on opportunistic payments to managers and other parties.

　The commonalities among the four explanations suggest they might be manifestations of a single explanation. As we have seen, conservatism encouraged by contracting, litigation, and political costs.

　The recent empirical evidence suggesting that accounting conservatism exists and is on the rise in recent years is consistent, in varying degrees, with the four conservatism explanations. That however, some of the evidence examined in Part II is also consistent with two explanations that do not imply conservatism. One of those explanations involves earnings management—management understates assets by taking excessive charges and excessive write-offs, perhaps in a "big bath," in order to overstate earnings in the future (Hanna 2002). The other is that management elects to abandon operations that are not profitable (Hayn1995). While both of these other explanations can explain firm attributes generated by conservatism such as the transitory nature of losses, they cannot individually or jointly explain the systematic understatement of net assets that is the hallmark of conservatism.

　The consistency of the evidence in Part II with the various conservatism explanations implies conservatism has a productive role in financial reports providing information to capital market investors. That implication suggests regulators and standard setters should rethink or redirect their opposition to conservatism.

　CONTRACTING EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSERVATISM

　Of the four conservatism explanations, I examine the contracting explanation most exhaustively because it is an early source of conservatism and its arguments are more fully developed. The more developed arguments allow more complete articulation of the explanation's links to the standard setters' information perspective. Also, although contracting explanations emphasize formal contracts, such as debt and management compensation contracts, they extend to the firm's organizational arrangements including managerial accounting and control systems. Even the tax explanation is linked to the contracting explanation in that the early uses of accounting (and writing) were control of assets and tax collection for the nobility.

　The contracting use of accounting is very old, spanning many centuries of corporate use (Watts and Zimmerman 1983), and millennia for management control (de Ste Croix 1956; Chadwick 1992).Researchers suggest that long usage influenced the development and nature of contemporary accounting and financial reporting and led to the conservative bias examined here (Watts and Zimmennan1986; Watts 1993; Basu1995).

　In contrast, other conservatism explanations rely on more recent phenomena. The increase in shareholder litigation that began in the U.S. in the 1960s, and grew significantly afterward, is a" relatively recent explanation for conservatism. The tax system's influence on financial reporting accounting methods, producing conservative methods such as LIFO, is another relatively recent explanation dating in the U.S. from 1909.Finally, and perhaps ironically given FASB's recent preference for neutrality over conservatism, some hypothesize that government regulation of financial reporting, dating from the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, actually contributes to conservatism.

　Contracting explains three attributes of accounting measures: timeliness, verifiability, and asymmetric verifiability. In debt, compensation, and other contract explanations, conservatism emerges almost naturally as an efficient contracting mechanism because it is optimal for contracts' performance measures to have more stringent verification standards for gains than for losses. As before , the asymmetry in standards leads to greater delay in the recognition of gains than in the recognition of losses. The result is that net assets and cumulative earnings are less likely to be overstated at any point in time, reducing the likelihood of distributions that violate contracts.

　Source: Watts R L. Conservatism in accounting part Ι:explanations and implication [J]. Accounting Horizons,2003,(3):207-221.

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